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The DCI has several times recently expressed to the Secretary of Defense USIB's interest in and hope for support of undertakings involving DOD resources. Two examples are [REDACTED] Similarly, 25X1A2d1 financing a \$425,000 increase in the [REDACTED] contract translation 25X1A2d1 project has been put on today's USIB agenda.

We believe it would be useful to explore possible staffing arrangements by which such matters might be preliminarily looked into by CIA and OSD together with any other immediately involved elements. An agreed informal SOP should, as a general rule, help expedite concrete action and insure the smoothest possible handling.

Gen. Truscott's office and OSO are both well placed to do the necessary informal and off-the-record staffing within their respective organizations. It should be possible for them in most cases together quickly to identify the elements of an issue. In many cases they should be able to propose to their principals a realistic and mutually acceptable solution. In the few cases where a USIB statement is indicated, the two offices can put clearly into focus the points requiring action and suggest the means of achieving a solution.

Our experience concerning [REDACTED] is illustrative. In the 25X1A2d1 spring of 1958 OSD arranged for the support of this promising Army project after the EOB had denied CIA the opportunity to help. These arrangements were carried through smoothly without the need for IAC intervention. Recently the Army briefed USIB on its [REDACTED] program, 25X1A2g

25X1A2g including [redacted] Directly, USIB expressed its support to the Secretary of Defense. It was not until the Army vigorously employed the USIB letter in support of an expanded \$16 million proposal that OSD learned that ACSI's earlier proposal for \$9 million had been disapproved within the Army itself. The Army's \$16 million proposal went substantially beyond what USIB and its chairman considered they were endorsing. But in the process, the facts were obscured, and a false pressure was built up, based on a misinterpretation of the USIB views which its chairman had expressed. We believe preliminary discussions among CIA, ACSI, and OSD could have made the issues more clear and, on balance, could have saved much time and energy.

There is a genuine practical and psychological advantage in the Service intelligence chiefs' having the prestige of USIB available to help them when really necessary to throw into clear relief the national interest behind some of their undertakings which may be unsympathetically viewed within their own Services. If this prestige is used sparingly and only when needed, it will be genuinely effective. But there may be an understandable tendency for the Service intelligence to invoke it too often; even though to do so weakens it in the end. We believe CIA and OSD are in a position to avoid this happening.

To return to the solution: a flexible, sensitive and discreet CIA-OSD means is indicated for identifying and accurately defining issues

resolving some of them where possible, providing a realistic appraisal when USIB referral is necessary, and accomplishing the needed preliminary staffing when Board action is desirable.

All of what has been said refers to issues involving additional DOD resources. The point is that such resources are the object of competition between numerous operational as well as intelligence programs. OSO, working with informed and sympathetic officials in COMINT, R&E, ARPA, etc., is prepared to arrive at a sound preliminary estimate of DOD realities before USIB action; in many cases it should be able to spare the need therefor, and when such action is needed, it should be able to assure the most favorable OSD venue. Gen. Truscott, similarly, is ideally situated and equipped to perform a like function in CIA; and working with the OSO staff, his people should be able to deal quickly, effectively and unobtrusively with very many of the major support problems of the intelligence business.

One last thought: Through such an arrangement, we should make additional progress toward viewing each individual intelligence claim on resources in the over-all context. In DOD, we have observed, intelligence undertakings tend to come to the fore seriatim. It is rare, unless we force it deliberately, that a comparison of expectations is made as between, say, spending \$16 million for [REDACTED] to detect Soviet missiles firings, as against \$5 million to reinforce COMINT for the same purpose, or

25X1A2g

\$3 million to reinforce generally the attache system, or \$250 million for SECURITY. Each case comes before OSD and before the Board independently and unrelatedly.

Neither Gen. Truscott and Gen. Erskine should be expected to make the final determination as to how resources will be devoted; but together they can usefully serve the DCI, the Board, and the Secretary of Defense as disinterested and appropriately staffed individuals. They can define and weigh preliminarily against each other the intelligence programs which compete for support among themselves and with other non-intelligence programs.